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Constitution, Custom, and Creed: Balancing Human 
Rights Concerns with Cultural and Religious Freedom in 
Today’s South Africa 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1996, the Republic of South Africa formally left a long and bitter 
history of apartheid by approving its final Constitution: a constitution 
which has been touted by scholars in South Africa and elsewhere as “one 
of the best constitutions in the world.”1 The 1996 Constitution is the 
result of several years of negotiations between dominant black, white, 
and Afrikaans parties. The Constitution attempts to reconcile the 
concerns of the old Afrikaans order with the new African National 
Congress’ (ANC) commitment to fundamental rights.2 Given South 
Africa’s history of intense discrimination during the “apartheid” regime, 
the new Constitution understandably focuses on human rights concerns 
and grants broad protection to individuals. South Africa’s Bill of Rights, 
which is part of its Constitution, is considered among the most 
comprehensive of all Bills of Rights to date.3 It firmly establishes a 
policy of non-racialism and non-sexism.4 In this paper, I seek to address 
some of the issues that arise in South Africa given both its constitutional 
commitment to principles of equality and its historical and constitutional 
commitment to group cultural and religious rights, which at times 
conflict with principles of non-racialism and non-sexism. 
While South Africa’s Constitution and Bill of Rights can certainly be 
described as “truly modern,”5 the reality is that the majority of South 
African individuals are not so “modern” in their political values. Many of 
the rights embraced by the Constitution and Bill of Rights do not reflect 
 1. Jennifer Joni, Access to Treatment for HIV/AIDS: A Human Rights Issue in the 
Developing World, 17 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 273, 274 (2002). 
 2. HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA’S 
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 76 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). 
 3. The detailed rights include a right to equality, human dignity, life, freedom and security 
of the person, freedom from slavery, servitude and forced labor, privacy, freedom of religion, belief 
and opinion, freedom of expression, and rights to housing, a clean environment, health care, 
education, food, water, and social security.  Karen Cavanaugh, Emerging South Africa: Human 
Rights Responses in the Post-Apartheid Era, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 291, 296–7 (1997). 
 4. Id. at 296. 
 5. See Mark S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court’s Embrace of Socio-
Economic Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 137, 160 (2003). 
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majoritarian sentiments; instead, they are based on international human 
rights norms.6  Indeed, some scholars argue that despite the official 
refusal to consult with international bodies during the drafting of the 
Constitution, international actors and norms had a “subtle” and 
“pervasive” influence on the values enshrined in the South African 
Constitution.7 The Constitution itself provides that courts interpreting the 
Bill of Rights “must consider international law.”8 As a result, some of the 
rights guaranteed (and particularly some of South African courts’ 
subsequent decisions in enforcing and defining those rights) run contrary 
to public concerns and desires. 
Prominent examples of the tension between court rulings and public 
opinion include rulings on the death penalty, abortion, and 
homosexuality. Researchers estimate that about eighty percent of South 
Africans favor capital punishment, but the Constitutional Court, South 
Africa’s highest court, interpreted the Constitution’s guarantee of a right 
to life to outlaw the death penalty.9 Additionally, estimates hold that the 
same percentage (eighty percent) of the population opposes abortion on 
demand, but the Constitution guarantees the right to everyone to “make 
decisions concerning reproduction” and to “security in and control over 
their body.”10 Finally, the vast majority of South Africans condemn 
homosexuality, but the Constitution proscribes discrimination based on 
sexual orientation by the State and by individuals.11 Most recently, on 
December 1, 2005, the Constitutional Court held that the Constitution 
demanded recognition of same-sex marriages and ordered Parliament to 
amend marriage laws to include same-sex couples.12 While these specific 
issues are beyond the scope of this paper, they highlight the potential 
disconnect between the courts and the South African people. That 
disconnect can be troublesome as it may encourage a disrespect for the 
rule of law in South Africa’s relatively new democracy. 
The idea that the courts exist to protect minority rights in the face of 
the majority’s opposition is not new. However, the existence of majority-
minority conflicts can prove particularly troublesome in the South 
African context. In addition to granting extensive individual rights, the 
Constitution also protects group cultural and religious rights: it 
 6. See Johan D. van der Vyver, State-Sponsored Proselytization: A South African 
Experience, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 779, 815 (2000). 
 7. KLUG, supra note 2, at 70. 
 8. Johan D. van der Vyver, Constitutional Perspective of Church-State Relations in South 
Africa, 1999 BYU L. REV. 635, 664 (quoting S. AFR. CONST. (act 108), § 39(1)(b)). 
 9. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 815. 
 10. Id. (quoting S. AFR. CONST. § 12(2)(a)). 
 11. Id. at 816. 
 12. See Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2005 (1) SA 1 (CC) at ¶¶ 114–19 (S. Afr.). 
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recognizes eleven official South African languages;13 it permits 
individuals to establish educational institutions on the basis of a common 
culture, language or religion;14 it recognizes the right to self-
determination by communities sharing a cultural or linguistic heritage;15 
and it supports “a notion of collective rights on the basis of cultural 
identity and even cultural self-determination.”16
Another important site of conflict between constitutional guarantees 
of individual rights and cultural or religious autonomy is in the area of 
gender discrimination. The Bill of Rights formally recognizes gender 
equality; issues of equality form a basis for the new Constitution. Some 
argue, though, that this conflicts with the Constitution’s recognition of 
indigenous law which includes certain cultural practices that some 
feminists oppose, particularly those related to marital property rights, 
traditional polygynous marriages, and intestate succession.17 The 
emphasis on gender equality may also conflict with some other 
constitutional provisions that recognize the possibility that legislation 
could validate religious marriages, such as Islamic or Hindu marriages.18
Even more fundamentally, some scholars argue that the very concept 
of “individual rights” is not a natural concept for some South African 
cultures, which emphasize the group over the individual and focus on 
community, mediation, and consensus in order to express their 
commitment to human worth.19 However, that is not to say that there is 
no basis for individual or human rights in South African culture. Indeed, 
I suggest that courts and lawmakers would be well-served to examine 
sources of social justice in customary law and to combine human rights’ 
aims with traditional modes of thinking. This would help to make human 
rights a concept that better resonates with the South African people. 
In this paper I address problems raised by the dichotomy of South 
Africa’s dual constitutional commitment to principles of equality and to 
respect for cultural and religious rights. The question is, what does a 
court do when a group’s cultural or religious practice conflicts with one 
of the other rights listed in the Constitution? For example, as mentioned 
above, many indigenous cultures and religious groups oppose 
homosexuality. Will a court permit a religious or cultural group the 
 13. KLUG, supra note 2, at 113. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 110–11. 
 18. Some oppose recognition of such religious marriages on the basis that they are in fact or 
at least potentially polygamous. 
 19. See SIRI GLOPPEN, SOUTH AFRICA: THE BATTLE OVER THE CONSTITUTION 131 
(Dartmouth Publ’g Co. 1997). 
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autonomy to discriminate on the basis on sexual orientation, or will the 
court’s commitment to individual equality trump those cultural and 
religious practices? At stake in this issue is not just the continued 
existence of traditional culture and religion. It is the very legitimacy of 
South Africa’s legal system. In South Africa’s new democracy, the rule 
of law is precarious; in many other African countries, the rule of law has 
given way to corruption and dictatorships. If South Africa wants to foster 
respect for the rule of law among its people, questions of individual 
rights and traditional culture must be dealt with appropriately. 
Part II addresses the cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in South 
Africa to provide a context for the pluralism in South Africa today. 
Given this great diversity and a history of conflict, it is especially 
important that the South African government properly negotiate between 
competing value systems and world-views, whether religious or 
customary. 
Part III briefly discusses the history of apartheid in South Africa. It 
highlights religious participation in and opposition to the National Party 
regime in order to understand the continuing role that churches play in 
South African today. It also focuses on the effects that colonial rule and 
apartheid had on the development of customary law—a term which 
refers to the local laws and traditions that have developed over time in 
specific South African cultural groups.  Examining the effects of 
Colonialism and apartheid on customary law helps to explain why 
customary law seems discriminatory and outdated today. Understanding 
the function of customary law also helps indicate what South Africans 
can do to solve the problem of outdated and discriminatory customary 
law. 
Part IV outlines specific provisions in the 1996 South African 
Constitution related to customary and religious rights, as well as 
guidelines for constitutional interpretation, and suggests some of the 
potential conflicts and issues those provisions present, particularly with 
respect to different opinions regarding the applicability of the Bill of 
Rights to customary law. 
Part V briefly traces the development of the jurisprudence in major 
South African cases dealing with cultural and religious rights in order to 
see how the Court has interpreted the Constitution and Bill of Rights so 
far, and to make predictions for the future. Generally, the South African 
Constitutional Court has granted broad religious freedom. However, its 
decisions tend to be based on principles of non-discrimination and 
equality, rather than liberty, which could prove troubling for religious or 
customary law that appears to discriminate on the basis of sex. 
Part VI suggests approaches the South African courts can take to 
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balance a commitment to individual human rights with a commitment to 
group cultural and religious rights. It proposes that South African courts 
should restrain themselves from casually invalidating customary law, and 
should instead leave provincial legislatures, which have constitutional 
authority over customary and indigenous law, the opportunity to 
introduce reforms. It also proposes that religious law can be negotiated 
similarly on a grass-roots level, rather than in the high courts,20 and 
argues that there already exists in South African culture an indigenous 
commitment to human rights and dignity. 
 
II.  CULTURAL, ETHNIC, AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The Republic of South Africa is an extremely diverse and pluralistic 
state. Alarmingly, South Africa’s population is also generally intolerant 
of other groups: social scientists have documented high levels of intense 
political intolerance in South Africa.21 While most people surveyed 
chose political factions (pitting themselves against either right-wing 
Afrikaaner parties, the ANC, or the Zulu Inkatha Freedom party) as their 
“least-liked group,” a small percentage (.9%) chose Muslims as their 
least-liked group.22 South Africa’s diverse ethnic and religious makeup 
(which also contributes to a diverse cultural makeup) highlights the 
 20. I have chosen to discuss both cultural or customary rights and religious rights in this 
paper for several reasons. First, the South African Constitution itself often groups cultural and 
religious rights in the same section, and provides for the same protection. Thus, a court’s 
interpretation of the limits of a cultural right or religious autonomy is likely to be similar. 
  Second, many argue that cultural or customary law is inextricably connected to 
traditional African religions, which saw little separation of religion and society and thus shaped and 
were shaped by customary law. In that sense, then, the right to practice customary law can be seen as 
related to the right to practice a traditional religion. This is especially likely given a recent court’s 
definition of “religion” in South Africa: “a system of faith and worship [as] the human recognition of 
superhuman controlling power and especially of a personal God or gods entitled to obedience or 
worship.” Wittman v Deutscher Schulverein 1998 (4) SA 423 (T) at 449 (S. Afr.), quoted in van der 
Vyver, supra note 8, at 651. Under this definition, it is certainly arguable that a traditional system of 
belief such as one that emphasizes paying homage to ancestors and pleasing the spirit of “ubuntu” 
through obedient and peaceful living is a “religion” and the laws associated with such a system 
somewhat “religious.” 
  Third, many of the issues arising in customary and religious law are similar, such as 
customary polygynous marriages and Islamic or Hindu polygamous marriages. Thus, an examination 
of courts’ treatment of polygyny (the term used for traditional African marriages with more than one 
wife) and polygamy (the term used for religious marriages involving more than one wife) would 
serve to explore aspects of both cultural and religious freedom. 
 21. The surveys used in a study on intolerance found that, for example, 65.3% of respondents 
agree that their least liked group should be officially banned, 61.8% thought that a member of their 
least liked group should not stand as a candidate in an election, and 74.3% agreed that their least 
liked group should not be allowed to hold a street demonstration. Amanda Gouws & Lourens M. du 
Plessis, The Relationship Between Political Tolerance and Religion: The Case of South Africa, 14 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 657, 661 (2000). 
 22. Id. at 671. 
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potential divisions at stake in the administration of individual and group 
rights. 
Ethnically, South Africa consists of various groups of black South 
Africans, white South Africans, mixed-race South Africans, Indians, and 
Asians. Black South Africans are estimated to comprise about seventy-
nine percent of South Africa’s forty-four million residents.23 Among 
black South Africans, there are further divisions among different 
traditional groups. Among the largest of these ethnic groups are the Zulu, 
the Xhosa, the Ndebele, and the Khoisan. Historically, these groups have 
had conflicts over land and resources; additionally, during apartheid, 
they were assigned to “homelands” and developed different systems of 
customary law (albeit with some general similarities). They speak 
different languages and have distinguishable physical features. An 
additional divide among black South Africans is the difference between 
urban and rural blacks. Many urban blacks, despite being of a particular 
cultural heritage, are quite Westernized in appearance and culture. Rural 
blacks, on the other hand, tend to exhibit closer ties to traditional culture. 
These divisions, along with economic and class differences, highlight the 
diversity that exists even among black South Africans. 
White South Africans, making up about ten percent of the 
population,24 also come from different heritages. Some descend from 
Dutch peoples, who settled in Cape Town in the 1650’s. They speak 
Afrikaans and often consider themselves “native” South Africans 
because of their deep historical roots in South Africa. Other white South 
Africans are descended from British settlers, who arrived in the late 
1800’s and early 1900’s. They are English speaking. Politically, 
Afrikaans and English-speakers have often, but certainly not always, 
shared similar interests. 
Mixed-race South Africans constitute about nine percent of South 
Africa’s population.25 Finally, South Africans of Indian, Middle Eastern, 
and Asian descent account for about two and a half percent of the 
population.26
Oftentimes falling along ethnic lines, religious diversity is also very 
abundant in South Africa, which as a whole is a very religious country.27 
About eighty percent of South Africans identify themselves as 
 23. CIA World Fact Book, South Africa, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
geos/sf.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2006). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Only about two percent of the population claimed no religious affiliation. Gouws & du 
Plessis, supra note 21, at 661. 
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Christian,28 but those Christians are divided up among a variety of 
denominations.29 In the white Afrikaaner community, the dominant 
church is the Dutch Reformed Church, which is divided into three 
splinter groups.30 Another dominant Christian group among Afrikaaner 
South Africans is the Apostolic Faith Group, transplanted from the 
United States.31 White English speakers in South Africa primarily belong 
either to Anglican, Methodist, or Roman Catholic churches.32 About 
twenty-five percent of the mix-raced South African population supports 
either the Anglican or the Roman Catholic Church.33 About ten percent 
of the Asian community is Christian.34 Twenty percent of black Africans 
belong to one of about six thousand varieties of black separatist or 
indigenous Christian movements, often referred to as “syncretistic” 
churches because of their combination of African traditional elements 
with mission Christianity.35 Twelve percent of blacks are Methodist.36
African traditionalists make up the second largest religious group, 
accounting for nearly fifteen percent of the South African population.37 
Despite the fact that the idea of the “traditional” has historically been 
used by colonial powers to “lock Africans into a particular way of life,” 
African traditional religion is actually fluid and adaptive, having 
“transform[ed] itself into a map for the negotiation of life in a colonial 
and postcolonial context.”38 Thus, it remains a considerable force in 
South Africa’s religious geography. 
Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism constitute the next largest groups. 
While they are minority religions (Hinduism with 1.75% of the total 
population,39 Islam with 1.09%,40 and Judaism (primarily orthodox) with 
.41%41), they have “established an enduring presence in South African 
 28. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 802. 
 29. There are more than thirty-four religious groupings and several thousand denominations 
of Christianity alone. Gouws & du Plessis, supra note 21, at 659. 
 30. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 802. The three splinter groups are the NGK, the NHK, 
and the GK (abbreviating their Afrikaans names). The largest (both during and after apartheid) is by 
far the NGK. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 803. 
 35. JAMES COCHRANE, JOHN DE GRUCHY & STEPHEN MARTIN, FACING THE TRUTH: SOUTH 
AFRICAN FAITH COMMUNITIES AND THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 27 (Ohio Univ. 
Press 1999). 
 36. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 803. 
 37. Gouws & Du Plessis, supra note 21, at 660. 
 38. COCHRANE, DE GRUCHY & MARTIN, supra note 35, at 22. 
 39. Gouws & Du Plessis, supra note 21, at 660. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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history and society.”42 Each of the three, because of their association 
with certain ethnicities, “had to struggle with discriminatory legislation 
and anti-alien restrictions.”43 Islam, especially, has been subject to 
restrictions and discrimination. Under the rule of the Dutch East India 
Company in the 1600’s, the public practice of Islam was illegal.44 In the 
nineteenth century, public health restrictions aimed at Muslims infringed 
on their burial and food-preparation practices, prompting a series of 
protests by the Islamic community.45 Later, in 1913, both Hindu and 
Muslim marriages were stripped of legal recognition, which was given 
only to Christian or civil marriages.46 The historical discrimination 
against minority religions such as Hinduism and Islam is important to an 
understanding of the contemporary treatment of these religions, 
particularly in regards to the recognition of Hindu and Muslim 
marriages. 
Other religious groups, such as Jainism, Rastafarianism, Buddhism, 
and Ba’hai, make up miniscule portions of the population but have in 
some cases proven significant in the realm of religious litigation.47
This combination of ethnic and religious diversity may sow the seeds 
of conflict in the future. Given the high levels of intolerance among 
many South Africans and South Africa’s ethnic and religious diversity, it 
is especially important that the courts and the legislature act reasonably, 
to both protect minorities and placate the majority to prevent political 
conflict from fomenting, as has happened in so many other post-colonial 
African nations. This is especially true considering ethnic and religious 
participation in the conflict over apartheid, which I will now discuss. 
 
III.  APARTHEID: RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION AND CULTURAL CHANGE 
 
An appreciation of the events leading up to South Africa’s 1996 
Constitution is helpful in understanding and predicting how courts will 
interpret that very new document. Accordingly, I will briefly discuss the 
history of apartheid and then highlight religious participation in and 
opposition to apartheid, as well as the changes that took place in 
customary law during the National Party regime. This will lay the 
 42. DAVID CHIDESTER, JUDY TOBLER, & DARREL WRATTEN, ISLAM, HINDUISM, AND 
JUDAISM IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 1 (Greenwood Press 1997). 
 43. Id. at 2. 
 44. Id. at 3. 
 45. Id. at 6–7. 
 46. Id. at 7. 
 47. For example, see infra Part V, discussing Prince v President of the Law Society of the 
Cape of Good Hope 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.), in which a Rastafarian challenged laws 
prohibiting the use of marijuana. 
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groundwork for a discussion of the state of religious and customary law 
in contemporary South Africa. 
 
A.  The Political History of Apartheid 
 
South Africa has been the goal of many successive invaders, with 
early conflicts between indigenous groups such as the Khoisan and the 
Bantu speaking peoples.48 The first foreign occupants arrived in 1652 
with the Dutch occupation of the area now known as Cape Town.49 
Later, the British seized the area and began colonizing in 1815. After 
some years of conflict between the Dutch (Boers) and British, the British 
declared the Union of South Africa a colony in 1910.50 While the 
marginalization of indigenous African cultures and peoples began with 
the first European settlers and colonization, “apartheid” officially came 
into play with the 1948 victory of the Nationalist Party, which ran on a 
platform of ethnic separation.51 The party initiated a series of laws and 
regulations that enforced apartheid, perhaps most notoriously the Group 
Areas Act of 1950, which officially segregated whites, blacks, Indians, 
and coloreds in urban areas into four distinct residential areas.52
In 1961, South Africa withdrew from the British Commonwealth and 
became a republic. The African National Congress (ANC), which had 
been banned in 1960, formed a military wing under the leadership of 
Nelson Mandela; shortly thereafter, the party’s leaders were 
imprisoned.53 Apartheid only continued to intensify, under the rationale 
that territorial segregation was appropriate in order to give “Native 
Reserves” as the historic homelands of Africans.54 As the government’s 
 48. Andrew P. Kult, Intestate Succession in South Africa: The “Westernization” of 
Customary Law Practices Within a Modern Constitutional Framework, 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 697, 697 (2001). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 698. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. at n.11. Other laws included the Population Registration Act, which provided for 
the classification of the entire South African population on the basis of race; the Immorality Act, 
which banned sexual relations between whites and blacks and later whites and coloreds; laws 
forbidding interracial marriages; the Separate Amenities Act, which authorized widespread 
segregation in public places and provided that separate facilities need not be equal; the Bantu 
Education Act which removed black education from the Education Ministry and placed it in the 
hands of Native Affairs; the University Education Act which prevented non-white students from 
attending previously-available universities; and the Suppression of Communism Act, which banned 
the South African Communist Party and subjected persons deemed to be communists to a wide range 
of restrictions. Id. 
 53. Id. at 699. 
 54. See id. at n.11; see generally, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, March 2003, available at 
http://www.stanford.edu/class/history48q/Documents/EMBARGO/TRC_rep_2003.pdf. 
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interest in reducing the population of blacks in white areas grew, a 
massive campaign resulted to force Africans into “homelands.”55 Over 
three million black South Africans were ultimately forcibly “settled.” 
Such drastic measures required the enforcement of an ever-more ruthless 
and totalitarian state.56
During the 1980’s, pressure mounted for change in South Africa on 
domestic and international fronts. Domestically, violence between the 
black majority and white minority persisted, and the government 
declared a state of emergency. Internationally, South Africa became 
something of a “pariah” as international groups and other countries 
attempted to influence change through economic boycotts and diplomatic 
measures.57 Then, in 1989, F.W. de Klerk assumed the presidency and 
soon took dramatic steps toward the dismantling of apartheid. In 1990, 
the ANC and other banned political organizations were legalized and 
leaders such as Nelson Mandela were released from prison.58 The 
government began to negotiate with black leaders and established an 
independent judiciary to guarantee racial equality. In 1991, all legislation 
enshrining apartheid was repealed. In 1992, white voters approved a 
referendum to end apartheid and party conferences began to prepare an 
interim constitution and set up multi-racial elections.59
Following those elections, the Interim Constitution went into effect 
in 1994. The Interim Constitution was intended to guide South Africa 
through a transition period while black and white South Africans drafted 
a new constitution.60 Despite conflicts between political parties, the new 
Constitution was negotiated and approved at a remarkable speed,61 
finally receiving endorsement from Parliament and voters and going into 
effect in December of 1996.62
 
B.  Religious Participation in and Resistance to Apartheid 
 
The 1996 Constitution’s provisions relating to religious liberty, 
government interaction with religious groups, and discrimination against 
(and by) religious groups63 can be traced to the history of religious 
participation or opposition during apartheid and the relationship between 
 55. See Kult, supra note 48, at 700. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 701. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 702. 
 60. Cavanaugh, supra note 3, at 294. 
 61. Id. 
 62. S. AFR. CONST. 1996. 
 63. See infra IV.B. 
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church and state that existed during the National Party’s rule. Perhaps the 
most notorious participant in apartheid was the Dutch Reformed Church, 
which “provided theological and biblical sanction for apartheid” until 
1986.64 Indeed, the official mouthpiece of the Church proclaimed in 
1948: 
 
Basic to our overall attitude is without doubt the strongest aversion to 
not only all instances of miscegenation between white and non-white 
but also of placing the non-whites on an equal footing with the 
European population on the social level. As a church we have as a 
rule . . . always deliberately aimed at separation of these two population 
groups. In this respect apartheid can rightfully be called the church 
policy.65   
 
In addition to this legitimization through an “apartheid theology,”66 the 
Dutch Reformed Church also actively promoted specific governmental 
policies of apartheid.67 Other white Christian denominations, while not 
giving official sanction to apartheid as the Dutch Reformed Church did, 
still often acquiesced to apartheid’s injustices.68
The Dutch Reformed Church’s support of apartheid resulted, 
reciprocally, in great state support for the Church. Scholars describe the 
pre-1994 South African political regime as one “fraught with all kinds of 
manifestations of what in American usage has come to be depicted as 
‘the establishment of religion.’”69 In return for the Church’s support of 
apartheid policies and laws, it “received favored treatment from the 
government” in a “political union of church and state.”70 This in turn led 
to a strong Christian bias in pre-1994 South African law.71 In addition to 
involvement with the Dutch Reformed Church, the South African 
government attempted to enforce segregation on other religious 
congregations, involving itself then in very detailed aspects of church 
policy during the years of apartheid. Even the Dutch Reformed Church 
 64. COCHRANE, DE GRUCHY & MARTIN, supra note 35, at 36. 
 65. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 804. 
 66. TRACY KUPERUS, STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA XI (St. 
Martin’s Press, Inc. 1999). 
 67. COCHRANE, DE GRUCHY & MARTIN, supra note 35, at 37. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 781. 
 70. Richard Cameron Blake & Lonn Litchfield, Religious Freedom in Southern Africa: The 
Developing Jurisprudence, 1998 BYU L. REV. 515, 521. 
 71. Such laws included Sunday observance laws, Christian oaths in criminal proceedings, 
education laws mandating a Christian education, and laws against blasphemy. See van der Vyver, 
supra note 6, at 783–88. Some of these laws are still on the books in South Africa. 
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eventually took issue with this type of meddling in church affairs.72
While the state supported the Dutch Reformed Church during the 
years of apartheid, the few religious groups that opposed apartheid were 
unfavorably treated. This unfavorable treatment was generally conducted 
under legislation such as the Internal Security Act, which authorized the 
banning of organizations that were judged to endanger the security of the 
state.73 Another act used to control the activities of religious groups was 
the Affected Organizations Act, which authorized the executive branch 
to withhold all foreign financial support for an organization that was 
“under the influence” of a person or organization abroad.74 Additionally, 
individual religious leaders were persecuted as the government sought to 
enforce its racial policy; this led Justice Sachs of the Constitutional Court 
to observe that “[r]eligious marginalization in the past coincided strongly 
in our country with racial discrimination, social exclusion and political 
disempowerment.”75 Because of the widespread repression of religious 
leaders and institutions that openly opposed apartheid, most religious 
groups were complacent or only mild in their criticism of apartheid, if 
not supportive.76
One strong exception to religious complacency in the face of 
apartheid is the Kairos Document, signed in 1985 by many theologians 
and lay persons. The document called on Christians to “participate in the 
struggle for liberation and for a just society” and upon church leaders to 
“further the liberation mission of God” and to be involved in acts of civil 
disobedience.77 It characterized the South African government as “[a] 
tyrant. A totalitarian regime. A reign of terror.”78 Other churches, such as 
the Methodist Church and the World Council of Churches, spoke out 
against apartheid as “a contradiction of the Gospel,” turning the Dutch 
Reformed Church’s rhetoric on its head.79 Ultimately, though, acts of 
religious activism against apartheid were far outnumbered by instances 
of religious respect for or acquiescence to apartheid.80
Religions, then, played a significant role in the battle over 
apartheid—whether through facilitation, acquiescence, or opposition. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. at 789. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 790. 
 76. See id. at 798. 
 77. Id. (quoting KAIROS DOCUMENT: CHALLENGE TO THE CHURCH: A THEOLOGICAL 
COMMENT ON THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA 48–49 (1985)). 
 78. Id. at 799 (quoting KAIROS DOCUMENT: CHALLENGE TO THE CHURCH: A THEOLOGICAL 
COMMENT ON THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA 43 (1985)). 
 79. Id. at 800. 
 80. See id. at 801. 
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They later played a role in South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (a commission that has explored injustices committed 
during apartheid and held individuals accountable for those injustices), 
and continue to play an important role in South Africa’s highly religious 
civil society. Seeing the relationship between churches and government 
during and after apartheid, we can better understand the Constitution’s 
emphasis on freedom of religion and especially its prohibitions against 
any sort of government favoritism for, or discrimination against, 
religious groups.81 However, given South Africa’s historical model of 
government cooperation with religious groups, it is also understandable 
that the Constitution allows for government support for religious 
organizations—as long as that support is administered fairly and 
neutrally. What remains to be seen is whether courts will stay true to the 
Constitution’s emphasis on the freedom of religious groups, or whether 
they will begin to punish groups that have counter-majoritarian or anti-
egalitarian values. Ironically, this could lead to the same judicial 
favoritism that existed during apartheid; this time, groups that oppose 
apartheid may not be marginalized, but groups that do not appear to 
favor individual rights may be. 
 
C.  Apartheid and Customary Law 
 
Not only did apartheid curtail the individual freedom of South 
Africans, it also continued colonialism’s marginalization of “traditional” 
African society and customary law. This helps to explain why the 
Constitution places special emphasis on customary and cultural rights, 
but is also unfortunately a cause of the current controversies over 
customary law, which has failed to adapt over time. This failure to adapt 
was partly due to the colonial power’s and the National Party’s treatment 
of customary law. Customary law was unwritten before European 
settlement; this allowed it to adapt to changing socioeconomic 
conditions.82 After colonization, though, in the late nineteenth century, 
the colonial Board of Native Administration required African people to 
write down their laws.83 While not intended to become binding law, 
eventually this codification became so. The unfortunate effect of this 
codification was that it “tended to ossify indigenous law.”84 While 
customary law was once responsive, it has now become outdated and can 
 81. See infra Part IV. 
 82. Charles Dlamini, Indigenous Law and the Bill of Rights, 11 BILL OF RIGHTS 
COMPENDIUM 6A-3 (1996). 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. at 6A-23. 
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serve to perpetuate discrimination and oppression, especially of women. 
Justice Mokgoro of the Constitutional Court explained that customary 
law is supposed to respond to society’s needs, but that, “[f]or reasons 
now well-documented in the colonial history of South Africa, which 
include self-serving political ideals of successive colonial governments, 
traditional institutions were largely formalized through legislation and 
infused with the typical conservatism of positive law, thus substantially 
reducing their inherent responsive potential.”85 Colonial powers, and 
then the apartheid regime, used customary law in order to control 
indigenous leaders and law. In 1985, under apartheid leadership, the 
“official” codes were again modified in writing. Thus, many have 
explained the origins of “official,” written customary law as “at best of 
dubious authority and at worst ‘invented tradition.’”86
Because of its ossification during colonial and National Party rule, 
“official” customary law often contradicts current human rights norms. 
There is, however, great potential for “living” customary law to embrace 
those norms and better articulate them in traditional African society. 
Because of customary law’s potential to “Africanize” human rights 
norms (and thus help to cement democracy in South African society), the 
courts and the legislature ought to carefully weigh how best to preserve 
“living” customary law in a modernizing society. The Constitution 
recognizes the importance of custom and attempts to provide a 
framework for its continuation in today’s South Africa. How exactly that 
will happen remains to be decided. 
 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO RELIGIOUS AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS 
 
The 1996 South African Constitution expressly recognizes the 
injustices of apartheid and has as its overarching goal the promotion of 
unity, social justice, and equality in a torn nation;87 many of its 
 85. Yvonne Mokgoro, The Customary Law Question in the South African Constitution, 41 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1279, 1281 (1997). 
 86. Wayne van der Meide, Comment, Gender Equality v Right to Culture: Debunking the 
Perceived Conflicts Preventing the Reform of the Marital Property Regime of the ‘Official Version’ 
of Customary Law, 116 S. AFR. L.J. 100, 105 (1999). 
 87. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, Preamble. The Preamble states that the Constitution’s purpose 
is to “Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice 
and fundamental human rights; Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which 
government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; Improve 
the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and Build a united and 
democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.” 
Immediately following the Preamble, its opening paragraphs read: “The Republic of South African is 
one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms; (b) Non-racialism and 
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provisions can be understood in that light. However, the Constitution’s 
own attempt to balance a commitment to individual rights rests uneasily 
with other provisions that purport to protect group cultural, traditional, 
and religious rights. I will now focus on some of the specific language of 
the Constitution and highlight potential problems and contradictions 
therein. Because the document is so new, there are many contours left to 
be defined in the coming years, but after presenting the Constitution’s 
key provisions relating to religious freedom and individual rights, I will 
look at the limited case law that has emerged as South African courts 
have applied it. 
 
A.  The Preamble and Civil Religion 
 
The Preamble of the Constitution immediately recognizes a role for 
religion in civil society in its references to God, stating in four different 
languages: “May God protect our people.”88 Shortly following the 
Preamble, Section 6 of the Constitution emphasizes cultural and religious 
concerns as they relate to language. In addition to recognizing eleven 
official languages, Section 6(2) states that “[r]ecognising the historically 
diminished use and status of the indigenous languages of our people, the 
state must take practical and positive measures to elevate the status and 
advance the use of these languages.”89 Furthermore, the section calls for 
a Pan African Language Board that must “promote and ensure respect 
for . . . Arabic, Hebrew, Sanskrit and other languages used for religious 
purposes in South Africa.”90 In this provision, then, we see two important 
principles: first, a commitment to use government resources and support 
to promote religious and cultural development; and second, the grouping 
of “cultural” and “religious” considerations into similar provisions with 








non-sexism; (c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law; (d) Universal adult suffrage, a 
national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, 
to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.” Id. at 1:1. Clearly, concerns for human 
rights, equality, and particularly non-racialism and non-sexism are priorities in the new Constitution. 
 88. Id. at Preamble. 
 89. Id. at 1:6(2). 
 90. Id. at 1:6(5). 
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B.  The Bill of Rights 
 
1.  Provisions for its application 
 
The next major chapter in the Constitution is the Bill of Rights, 
which grants extensive rights focused on “human dignity, equality and 
freedom.”91 The first important consideration in understanding the Bill of 
Rights is determining to whom it applies. As in the Interim Constitution, 
the Bill of Rights first and foremost “applies to all law, and binds the 
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.”92 Then, 
the document states that the provisions of the Bill of Rights “bind[] a 
natural or juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking 
into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by 
the right.”93 It then clarifies that, when applying the Bill of Rights to a 
“natural or juristic person” in those circumstances, a court “in order to 
give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the 
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that 
right; and may develop rules of the common law to limit the right.”94
Those provisions are important, and controversial, for two reasons. 
First, the provision that the Bill of Rights binds “natural or juristic” 
persons in addition to the government suggests that it may be used to 
enforce, for example, equality provisions against individuals (or private 
institutions such as churches) that discriminate on some basis (e.g., 
failure to ordain women as priests). There is still much controversy over 
whether the Bill of Rights applies in such cases, but courts tend to 
interpret it to do so and many scholars assume that it does.95 Second, here 
the Constitution provides that the courts should “develop” or “change” 
the common law in order to accord with rights granted in the 
Constitution, should controversy arise. While this section may explicitly 
limit the courts’ ability to “develop” law to the common law, this 
provision may also be an authorization or invitation for the courts to 
reform other sources of law, such as customary or religious law, to bring 
them in harmony with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. This will be 
particularly relevant in a later discussion of the court’s potential role as it 
adjudicates disputes in which religious or customary law conflicts with 
constitutional law. 
 
 91. Id. at 2:7(1). 
 92. Id. at 2:8(1). 
 93. Id. at 2:8(2). 
 94. Id. at 2:8(3). 
 95. See Blake & Litchfield, supra note 70, at 528. 
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2. Equality and non-discrimination 
 
The next part of the Bill of Rights deals with equality. Specifically, 
the Bill of Rights provides that “[t]he state may not unfairly discriminate 
directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including . . . ethnic or social origin . . . religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, [or] language.”96 Thus, the state is barred from discriminating 
unfairly on the basis of religious belief or culture. The next section 
extends that prohibition against discrimination on any of those grounds 
to natural or juristic persons,97 similar to the application of other equality 
provisions to natural persons. Since the provision against discrimination 
also prohibits discrimination based on gender and sexual orientation, 
religious or cultural practices that are discriminatory may be considered 
unconstitutional.98
Another important fact to note is that the provision prevents “unfair” 
discrimination. This may be because, due to apartheid’s history and the 
many people who have been unfairly disadvantaged due to the National 
Party’s oppressive regime, the Constitution wants to ensure that 
“affirmative action” programs or other remedial programs attempting to 
establish substantive economic and political equality are not considered 
unconstitutional. Indeed, another part of the equality provision states that 
“[t]o promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures 
designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons,99 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.”100 Benign 
discrimination is not unconstitutional; only “unfair” discrimination is 
unconstitutional. Not only is this relevant to state action, but it may also 
be relevant to private parties affected by this provision of the Bill of 
Rights. For example, in the event that a court were to find this provision 
applicable to a private institution such as a church, the church may be 
able to argue that, although it may discriminate (as in the example above, 
the failure to ordain female ministers or priests on the basis of gender), 
this discrimination is not “unfair” according to the terms of the 
Constitution because it has a legitimate purpose for the institution’s 
goals.101 Such an argument has not yet been tested in the courts, but it is 
a viable option that will be considered further later.102
 96. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, 2:9(3). 
 97. Id. at 2:9(4). 
 98. See Blake & Litchfield, supra note 70, at 528. 
 99. This particular clause— “categories of persons”—also provides evidence for the Bill of 
Right’s commitment to collective or group rights, which will be discussed later. 
 100. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, 2:9(2). 
 101. See Blake & Litchfield, supra note 70, at 529. 
 102. The burden of proof that discrimination is “fair” would be on the institution, especially in 
  
128 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 21 
 
3.  The free exercise of religion 
 
The next provisions relevant to religious and customary rights are in 
Section 15, which deals specifically with the free exercise of religion. 
Section 15(1) provides that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of 
conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.”103 This is similar to 
norms given in international documents on religious freedom and 
protects, apparently absolutely, freedom of conscience and belief. The 
next provision concerns the relationship of churches and the state, and 
provides that “[r]eligious observances may be conducted at state or state-
aided institutions, provided that (a) those observances follow rules made 
by the appropriate public authorities; (b) they are conducted on an 
equitable basis; and (c) attendance at them is free and voluntary.”104 This 
provision is important because it suggests that, unlike the United States, 
but like many European countries, South Africa has no “establishment 
clause” limitation on freedom of religion. There are “compelling reasons 
for holding that [this section] of the Constitution does not entail an 
‘establishment clause.’”105 Other scholars have commented that “[i]t was 
clear that the multi-party negotiators had no intention whatsoever of 
using the Constitution or the Bill of Rights to erect a wall of separation 
between church and state.”106 Thus, the South African government can be 
described as “accommodationist” in its approach to religious groups: it 
may support such groups, as long as its support is fair and even-
handed107 and it has a valid reason for doing so.108
The final provision of the “religious freedom” section has been the 
subject of much controversy in interpretation. It provides that “[t]his 
section does not prevent legislation recognising marriages concluded 
under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law; or 
systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by 
persons professing a particular religion.”109 The section qualifies, 
however, that recognition of religious or traditional marriages “must be 
light of 2:9(5): “Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair 
unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.” Thus, it would be a difficult battle for anyone 
to prove that discrimination is fair, especially given the Constitution’s consistent commitment to 
equality. Scholars, however, suggest that legislation defining “unfair” in a religious context, which is 
warranted by Section 9(4), may eliminate the problem. Id. 
 103. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, 2:15(1). 
 104. Id. at 2:15(2). 
 105. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 824. 
 106. Blake & Litchfield, supra note 70, at 524. 
 107. See Gouws & du Plessis, supra note 21, at 682. 
 108. See Christof Heyns & Danie Brand, The Constitutional Protection of Religious Human 
Rights in Southern Africa, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 699, 751 (2000). 
 109. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, 2:15(3). 
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consistent with this section and the other provisions of the 
Constitution.”110 Notably, the section can be generally understood to 
contemplate customary indigenous law systems and religious personal 
law systems (most obviously Muslim personal law). African customary 
law is “largely unwritten and originated from the customary practices of 
the black people in a particular context.”111 It can also be codified 
customary law such as the KwaZulu-Natal Code, codified during the 
colonial period and modified from time to time during apartheid.112 Some 
aspects of African customary law that may be most relevant in this 
provision are customary marriages and the processes inherent in that 
tradition, inheritance law, and intestate succession traditions. Muslim 
personal law is “religiously based private law which pertains to, inter 
alia, marriage, divorce, inheritance, polygamy, custody and guardianship, 
and which falls under the category of family law.”113 The most litigated 
issue in both customary law and personal religious law is the validity of 
marriage, particularly when polygyny or polygamy is involved. 
Much of the controversy over the extent of the right granted by this 
section is that, although the section is part of the Bill of Rights, it does 
not itself recognize a fundamental right to the recognition of religious 
and customary marriages or personal laws. It merely provides that 
legislation can be established to recognize such systems, and then it is up 
to the legislative branch to do so. That much is generally agreed upon by 
scholars. Whether and to what extent such legislation would be subject to 
constitutional scrutiny is, however, debated. Some authors suggest that 
this section immunizes legislation recognizing religious or customary 
personal law from constitutional attack.114 The implication of this is that 
Section 15 trumps the equality clause of the Bill of Rights.115 For 
instance, if legislation recognizing Muslim family law is passed, it would 
 110. Id. 
 111. Dlamini, supra note 82, at 6A-3. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Najma Moosa, Muslim Personal Laws Affecting Children: Diversity, Practice and 
Implications for a New Children’s Code for South Africa, 115 S. AFR. L. J. 479, 479 (1998). Moosa is 
careful to point out that Muslim personal law is not the same as “Islamic law.” Muslim personal law 
has its origin in the Qur’an and is limited in scope, as only a limited number of verses in the Qur’an 
deal with legal matters and none deal with commercial and criminal law. Islamic law, on the other 
hand, is “the conservative interpretation and application of the primary sources by early Muslim 
jurists.” Id. at 480. It is this Islamic law, and not Muslim personal law, that is generally the source of 
conflict in countries (e.g. Nigeria) with Muslim populations who want to enforce “Sharia” law. 
 114. See Gouws & du Plessis, supra note 21, at 685: “Section 15(3)(a) of the Constitution 
authorizes legislation recognizing marriages concluded under systems of religious personal or family 
law and safeguards such legislation against constitutional challenges.” The authors note, however, 
that no right is “entrenched.” Id. 
 115. See June Sinclair, Family Rights, in RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE NEW SOUTH 
AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 507, 559 (van Wyk et. al. eds., Juta & Co, Ltd. 1994). 
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be immune from constitutional attack even if aspects of it are unfairly 
discriminatory based on sex.116 Other authors, including at least one 
justice of the South African Constitutional Court, maintain that even 
legislation authorized by the section would still have to meet 
constitutional muster because of the qualification that the legislation 
cannot be inconsistent with other provisions of the Constitution.117 They 
suggest that the Bill of Rights applies to all law, including customary 
law.118 Customary and religious law would then have to be consistent 
with other rights, such as equality rights. 
If that is true, provisions recognizing customary rights may be 
effectively “rendered nugatory, as it does not protect this type of 
legislation from any constitutional provision which is likely to threaten 
it.”119 In other words, even though legislation recognizing customary law 
will be immune from constitutional attacks based on Section 15, it will 
be subject to attacks based on any other section. This is significant 
because legislation recognizing customary marriages, for example, “[is] 
more likely . . . to face challenges in terms of the equality provision. 
Some may argue, for instance, that polygamy constitutes unfair 
discrimination.”120 In Part V, I will address how this interpretive problem 
has played out so far in Parliament and in the courts. 
 
4.  Other rights relevant to religious expression 
 
Several rights following the religious freedom clause are relevant to 
the expression and practice of religion. The Bill of Rights protects 
freedom of expression,121 freedom of assembly,122 freedom of 
association,123 and the right to education.124 One aspect of the right to 
education that is particularly relevant to religious and cultural rights is 
the right to “receive education in the official language or languages of 
their choice in public educational institutions where that education is 
reasonably practicable.”125 Additionally, “[e]veryone has the right to 
establish and maintain, at their own expense, independent educational 
 116. See id. 
 117. See Mokgoro, supra note 85, at 1287. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Nicholas Smith, Freedom of Religion Under the Final Constitution, 114 S. AFR. L.J. 217, 
223 (1997). 
 121. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, 2:16(1). 
 122. Id. at 2:17. 
 123. Id. at 2:18. 
 124. Id. at 2:29. 
 125. Id. 
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institutions” provided that they do not discriminate on the basis of race 
and maintain appropriate standards.126 State subsidies are permissible for 
independent institutions.127
 
5.  Cultural and linguistic rights 
 
Following the presentation of educational rights are cultural and 
linguistic rights. Section 30 guarantees that “[e]veryone has the right to 
use the language and participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no 
one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any 
provision of the Bill of Rights.”128 Section 31 further states that, 
 
Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may 
not be denied the right, with other members of that community, to 
enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and to 
form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations 
and other organs of civil society. [These] rights . . . may not be 
exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of 
Rights.129  
 
Both sections, like the sections found in the guarantees of religious 
freedom, seem to guarantee a level of cultural autonomy and self-
determination. Significantly, Section 31 especially emphasizes 
communal or group rights. This was possibly a concession to African 
leaders who stressed a “consociational” constitutional model, which 
emphasizes community over the individual, as more in harmony with 
African culture.130 It may also have been a concession to Afrikaaners 
who wanted a degree of self-determination.131 However, despite the 
recognition of the importance of cultural group rights, the limitation—
that such rights cannot be exercised inconsistently with other provisions 
in the Bill of Rights—suggests that this provision is little more than mere 
lip-service to group cultural and religious rights, and that “customary law 
will soon be no more than an insignificant aspect in what will effectively 
become a completely ‘Westernized’ South Africa.”132 Since many 
customary practices result in discrimination, it is unlikely that they will 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 2:30. 
 129. Id. at 2:31(1–2). 
 130. See GLOPPEN, supra note 19, at 235. 
 131. See id. 
 132. Kult, supra note 48, at 697. 
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pass constitutional scrutiny.133 Professor A.J. Kerr estimates that 
applying the Bill of Rights to customary law would require a change in 
about eighty-five percent of customary law.134
 
6. Interpreting the Bill of Rights 
 
There is certainly disagreement among scholars about how to 
interpret certain provisions that grant (but then limit) cultural and 
religious rights. Section 39 provides the courts some guidance on 
interpreting the Bill of Rights. It provides that courts, tribunals, or 
forums interpreting the Bill of Rights “must promote the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality, and freedom; must consider international law; and may consider 
foreign law.”135 Each of these provisions has come into play for the 
court. First, courts, when interpreting customary and religious law and 
the Bill of Rights, often do look to the overall purpose of the Bill of 
Rights. Unfortunately for those favoring group autonomy, courts tend to 
rely almost exclusively on equality, at the expense of freedom.136
Second, the provision that courts must consult with international law 
is one that is taken seriously, and South Africa generally strives to act in 
accordance with international treaties and documents relating to human 
rights. This becomes problematic when international human rights ideals, 
largely Western in conception, conflict with indigenous communal 
values. South African courts, thus far, defer to international rather than 
local norms. 
Finally, pursuant to the last part of the interpretation clause, South 
African judges frequently consult foreign law, including case law. This is 
understandable, given the newness of the Constitution and lack of 
precedent interpreting provisions. South Africa has looked to Canadian 
courts because of the similarities between the Canadian and South 
African Bill of Rights. South African courts also frequently look at 
religious freedom jurisprudence in the United States. While this may be 
helpful, the following section will explain the problems that inhere in 
 133. Id. at 705–06. 
 134. A.J. Kerr, Inheritance in Customary Law Under the Interim Constitution and Under the 
Present Constitution, 115 S. AFR. L.J. 262, 266 (1998). Part V develops this problem further and Part 
VI suggests solutions that will prevent the obliteration of customary law while preserving essential 
individual rights. 
 135. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, 2:39(1). 
 136. In some ways, this is similar to religious freedom jurisprudence in the United States, 
which seems to have shifted from an emphasis on liberty and free exercise to a focus on equality. 
See generally, W. Cole Durham & Brett G. Scharffs, State and Religious Communities in the United 
States: The Tension Between Freedom and Equality (forthcoming). 
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South Africa’s reliance on U.S. law and precedent. It may be cause for 
concern if South Africa tends too much towards an American religious 
freedom jurisprudence or an American understanding of the value of 
indigenous culture. The political strife that erupts in the United States 
every time there is an establishment issue is more than South Africa 
needs right now as it attempts to build social cohesion and tolerance for 
other groups—in addition to the fact that the differences between the 
American and South African Constitutions would make South Africa’s 
adoption of American religious freedom jurisprudence unfounded. It is 
clearer still that the United States’ treatment of indigenous peoples and 
cultures is something of a disaster—a model South Africa would not 
want to follow. 
Part 2 of Section 39 states that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, 
and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights.”137 This may be significant for two reasons. First, it seems to 
place a limit on the applicability of customary law: it must promote the 
objectives of the Bill of Rights. This may lead to contradictions, though: 
is promoting cultural identity and self-determination in line with the 
spirit of the Bill of Rights? What if it conflicts with principles of 
equality? Such are not easy questions to answer, and require value 
judgments that courts might not be comfortable making. A second reason 
why the clause is important is that it suggests that courts have 
jurisdiction over customary law, giving them the ability to interpret and 
to “develop” customary law, as they do the common law. The question 
remains, though, whether the courts are the best instrument to interpret 
and develop customary law.138
Finally, the instructions on constitutional interpretation clarify that 
the Bill of Rights “does not deny the existence of any other rights or 
freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary 
law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.”139 
Again, like other provisions, this recognizes the existence and validity of 
customary law and rights and suggests that such may be enforceable in 






 137. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, 2:39(2). 
 138. See infra Section VI. 
 139. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, 2:39(3). 
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C.  Constitutional Recognition of Traditional Authority 
 
Beyond the Bill of Rights, there are other sections of the Constitution 
that recognize cultural rights. Section 12 recognizes the “institution, 
status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law.”140 
It further stipulates that a traditional authority “may function subject to 
any applicable legislation and customs.”141 Finally, it mandates that the 
courts “apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the 
Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary 
law.”142 The Constitution also defines the roles of traditional leaders by 
providing for national legislation recognizing a role for traditional 
leaders at a local level and for the establishment of national houses or 
councils of traditional leaders.143
Part V outlines some of the main sources of controversy in the 1996 
South African Constitution: debates over which constitutional provisions 
trump the others in the case of a conflict between the two; conflict over 
the meaning and limitations of the free exercise of religion and state 
involvement in religious affairs; and the underlying conflict between 
values of individual equality and group cultural and religious rights. 
Because the Constitution is less than ten years old, the Constitutional 
Court has not had the opportunity to develop a clear jurisprudence on all 
of these issues. This paper will now, however, look at some of the 
principal cases dealing with religious freedom and customary law to 
provide an understanding of the direction that courts are moving and 
make predictions and suggestions for the future. 
 
V.  LEGAL TRENDS 
 
The 1996 Constitution gives the South African Constitutional Court 
extensive powers, and the Court has been an important part of South 
African politics from the beginning.144 It can rule on “all constitutional 
matters and all matters relevant to the constitution, and has the power to 
determine whether a matter is of such relevance. It is the ultimate 
authority on whether national and provincial legislation is 
unconstitutional.”145 Given the weak separation of powers between 
Parliament, the executive and the courts in South Africa, as well as the 
 140. Id. at 12. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. GLOPPEN, supra note 19, at 226. 
 145. Id. at 226–27. 
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character of the Constitution itself and the Bill of Rights, the “Court 
could [also] end up with what amounts to significant legislative 
powers.”146 Indeed, the Court has already made some important and 
controversial rulings in its brief history. This discussion will first focus 
on three important Constitutional Court cases that have helped to define 
the extent and limits of religious freedom and church-state relations. It 
will then focus on religious and customary marriage and inheritance 
laws, discussing how the legislature has tried to implement Bill of Rights 
provisions and  the Court has responded to those attempts. I choose to 
focus on marriage laws because they best illustrate the constitutional 
conflicts between religious and cultural freedom, and individual 
equality—especially gender equality.147
 
A.  Religious Freedom Jurisprudence 
 
One of the first major rulings on religious issues was Lawrence v. 
State.148 In Lawrence, three employees of a Seven Eleven chain store 
were charged and convicted of violating the “Liquor Act” of 1989, which 
prohibited the sale of liquor on Sunday.149 The employees challenged the 
laws as “inconsistent with the right to freedom of religion, belief and 
opinion.”150 A plurality of the Court ultimately held that the law was 
constitutional, but there were several opinions which produced little 
consensus on the meaning of the right to freedom of religion, belief and 
opinion.151 Much of the debate focused on whether there was an 
“establishment” clause in the South African Constitution.152 While 
religious and customary law likely does not implicate issues of 
“establishment,” the issue of whether the South African Constitution 
 146. Id. at 227. 
 147. I choose to focus on marriage laws because they best illustrate the constitutional conflicts 
between religious and cultural freedom, and individual equality (especially gender equality). These 
conflicts also give us a picture of whether the South African government treats similar situations, 
such as polygamy, differently, depending on whether they arise in a customary or religious context. 
 148. 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 149. Id. Because the violations and arrests took place in 1995 and 1996, the judgment was 
made based on the Interim Constitution because it was that Constitution that was in effect at the time 
of the alleged offense. However, there is no material difference in the sections at issue between the 
Interim and 1996 Final Constitution, so the analysis would most likely be the same today, under the 
Final Constitution. 
 150. Id. at ¶ 7. 
 151. Indeed, there was sparse agreement: there were three different opinions, totaling 138 
pages. 
 152. Lawrence is an extremely important case in South Africa’s religious freedom 
jurisprudence and is treated extensively in most scholarly writing describing South Africa’s system 
of church-state relations. It is less important, however, for our own discussion, so I will mention only 
those aspects of the decision that are most relevant. 
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provides a similar framework for religious jurisprudence as the United 
States’ Constitution is significant because it can help to determine what 
South Africa may or should do with regard to following U.S. trends in 
other circumstances. 
The main opinion, authored by Justice Chaskalson, determined that 
there is no “establishment clause” in the Constitution.153 Because South 
Africa lacks establishment jurisprudence, there is no constitutional 
problem with laws that support some form of religious belief, so Sunday 
closing laws are appropriate. Other scholars have pointed out compelling 
reasons suggesting that he was correct: the whole religion section is 
based on free exercise language, and other sections actually make 
provisions for instances of establishment (such as sections allowing 
religious activities in government or public institutions).154
A concurring opinion, authored by Justice Sachs, assumed that the 
South African Constitution does proscribe establishment.155 The extent to 
which the Sachs opinion assumed the existence of an establishment 
clause and relied on the United States’ religious freedom jurisprudence in 
its decision is alarming. Not only is there little textual support for the 
idea that the South African Constitution contains an establishment 
clause, but there are also historical reasons why South Africa does and 
should differ from the United States in that respect. One scholar suggests 





 153. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 823. 
 154. See id. at 824. Justice Chaskalson did determine that “establishment” practices may be 
unconstitutional if they amount to unfair discrimination in violation of equality provisions, and also 
conceded that there were probably some circumstances in which the state infringed on free exercise 
by coercing people, directly or indirectly, to observe particular religious practices. Here, though, he 
determined that no such coercion had been proven. On the contrary, he reasoned that the laws had 
the secular purpose of providing a day of rest from the workweek, and that, although that day 
happened to fall on the Christian Sabbath, that fact did not compel or coerce people from 
worshipping as Christians. Lawrence, 1997 (10) BCLR at ¶ 95–96. 
 155. See van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 824. Justice Sachs held that using Christian holidays 
as “closed days” amounted to state endorsement of the Christian Sabbath. Nevertheless, he 
concurred in the judgment upholding the laws, arguing that the negative impacts suffered by non-
Christians forced to obey the law would be trivial and the benefits of the law had a legitimate secular 
purpose, so the “establishment” violation is justified. Id. at 824–25. However, despite its assumption 
that South Africa’s Constitution has an “establishment clause,” Justice Sachs’s treatment of any such 
clause is quite different than the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the clause. Justice 
Sachs seems to balance the state’s interest in “establishing” with the individual’s interest in non-
establishment; if the state’s interest is more compelling, then the violation is justified. In the United 
States, on the other hand, courts tend not to engage in any balancing test when it comes to 
establishment: if a law establishes, it is invalid per se, regardless of great benefits or minimal harm. 
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[T]he anticolonial spirit of the American Constitution . . . instilled 
essentially libertarian values in the fabric of all constitutional 
arrangements. South Africa, in response to its history of 
institutionalized discrimination, constructed a new dispensation where 
considerations of human dignity and equal protection reign supreme. 
Whereas the libertarian purport of American institutions dictated the 
“wall of separation” of church and state with all its ramifications, the 
egalitarian predilections of South Africa set that country on a different 
course. In South Africa, religion is not perceived as a governmental 
taboo, but rather the South African Constitution requires 
evenhandedness in official dealings relating to religion and religious 
institutions.156
 
Beyond the historical differences between South Africa and the 
United States, differences in the cultural and religious make-up of the 
two countries make “the application of American jurisprudence in this 
context to South Africa . . . questionable.”157 While it is understandable 
that South Africa looks at other countries for guidance in interpreting its 
own human rights provisions, South African courts would be well-
advised to recognize the unique aspects of the South African experience 
and Constitution, and to be willing to break new ground in religious 
jurisprudence to best meet South Africa’s needs. As suggested earlier, 
the divisive debates in the United States over the establishment of 
religion in contexts such as school prayer and the Pledge of Allegiance 
would likely be unnecessary and harmful in South Africa, and would 
only contribute further to political unrest and intolerance there.158 
 156. Van der Vyver, supra note 8, at 671. 
 157. Heyns & Brand, supra note 108, at 760. 
 158. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice O’Regan, admitted that the South African 
Constitution contains no establishment clause. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 825. However, she 
argued that any “public endorsement of one religion over another is in itself a threat to the free 
exercise of religion.” Lawrence, 1997 (10) BCLR at ¶ 123. She focused on South Africa’s history of 
repressive religious favoritism and emphasized a need for absolute “[f]airness and evenhandedness 
in relation to diverse religions.” Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 825. 
The difference between the plurality and dissent turns on the difference between “coercion” and 
“endorsement.” Justice Chaskalson suggests that only state coercion in religious matters violates 
freedom of religion. Justice O’Regan counters that endorsement also violates freedom of religion. 
Some scholars suggest that Justice O’Regan’s approach may be better, considering the egalitarian 
concerns of the South African Constitution. Heyns & Brand, supra note 108, at 761. Others, 
however, advocate Chaskalson’s “coercion” test for the South African context: 
 
Coercion—be it direct or indirect—provides a bright line and avoids problems evident in 
the endorsement regime. Further, it is a safer initial position, and its use allows the South 
African case law to develop slowly and deliberatively—a judicially conservative result 
the Constitutional Court has approved. While using the endorsement test may be enticing 
for the Constitutional Court, a better position for now would be to follow Chaskalson’s 
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Overall, and despite the sharp divides among the Court, the ultimate 
holding in Lawrence bodes well for the future of South African religious 
freedom jurisprudence because it forges a new path for South African 
church-state relations which can provide for strong individual religious 
freedom without invalidating all state-sponsored religious initiatives. 
The Constitutional Court decided another landmark case dealing 
with religious freedom in 2000. In Christian Education South Africa v. 
Minister of Education, parents challenged the constitutionality of an act 
that prohibited corporal punishment in schools.159 They argued that the 
right to apply corporal punishment in parochial schools was guaranteed 
by the right to religious self-determination, because corporal punishment 
was advocated in the Bible.160 The Court denied the claim on at least two 
grounds, both of which have important implications for the development 
of religious freedom jurisprudence in South Africa. First, the Court 
reasoned that the biblical texts that the parents relied on referred to 
punishment inflicted on children by parents, not on children in schools.161 
The second and related point was that “flogging” of children has been 
“designated in South Africa, and elsewhere, as a cruel and inhuman (or 
degrading) punishment; and, in terms of the Constitution, the right to 
self-determination may not be exercised ‘in a manner inconsistent with 
any provision of the Bill of Rights.’”162
This holding is significant for two reasons. First, although the Court 
did not stress this in its opinion, it is interesting that the Court was 
willing to question the biblical interpretation of the parents involved in 
the litigation. This seems to run counter to what the Court normally does, 
in that the justices seem to be questioning the validity of a certain 
religious belief or interpretation. While people may agree with the result 
in this opinion, it is potentially disconcerting that the Court would place 
itself as the definitive biblical interpreter. Second, the Court explicitly 
favored provisions against “cruel and inhuman (or degrading) 
punishment” over provisions on religious freedom. The Court applied 
quite strictly the limitation on religious freedom: that it cannot conflict 
coercion-only test. Blake & Litchfield, supra note 70, at 557–58. 
 
Furthermore, since endorsement might often be considered coercive, using the “coercion-only” test 
would not substantially curtail religious freedom or result in discrimination. Id. at 556–57. Because 
the “coercion” test seems more in line with South Africa’s Constitution and understanding of 
appropriate church-state relations, it is the better test to help South Africa develop its own 
jurisprudence. 
 159. Christian Education S. Afr. v Minister of Education 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at ¶ 1 (S. Afr.). 
 160. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 828. 
 161. Id. at 828–29. 
 162. Id. at 829 (quoting Christian Education S. Afr. v Minister of Education).  . 
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with other provisions of the Bill of Rights. The discussion of religious 
and customary marriages below will further examine the extent to which 
courts have placed equality interests or other rights in the Bill of Rights 
over religious and cultural rights. 
Whether or not one agrees with the outcome in Christian Education, 
it did set limits on an individual’s or a group’s expression of religious 
freedom. In 2002, however, the South African Constitutional Court 
broadly interpreted freedom of religious expression in the case Prince v. 
The President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope.163 Prince 
wished to become an attorney and had satisfied all academic 
requirements but needed to perform a period of community service as 
mandated by the “Attorneys Act.” His application for community service 
through the Law Society was denied because he disclosed that he had 
two previous convictions for possession of cannabis, and expressed his 
intentions to continue to use the drug because it was part of his religion 
as a Rastafarian.164 The Law Society contended that his conviction of 
breaking the law and declared intention to continue to break the law 
made him a person unfit for the profession of an attorney.165 Prince 
challenged the constitutional validity of laws against cannabis possession 
or use if those laws apply to prohibit required religious use.166
The Constitutional Court began by accepting the premise that 
cannabis is “central” to the Rastafari religion.167 The Court also 
acknowledged the fact that there is a highly strict and elaborate protocol 
regarding the use of cannabis, and that the religion does not provide 
justification for non-religious, casual use of the drug.168 The parties 
stipulated that Prince was a true adherent of the Rastafari religion and 
had used cannabis in accordance with Rastafari protocol.169 Thus, the 
prohibition against cannabis use for religious purposes was an 
infringement on Prince’s religious freedom and a failure to accommodate 
religious practice. Based on the relevant constitutional provisions, 
including the limitations clauses of the Bill of Rights, the Court 
crystallized the issue as, “whether the failure to accommodate the 
appellant’s religious belief and practice by means of the exemption . . . 
can be accepted as reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, freedom and equality.”170
 163. 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 164. Id. at ¶ 1. 
 165. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 166. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 167. Id. at ¶ 18. 
 168. Id. at ¶ 20. 
 169. Id. at ¶ 21. 
 170. Id. at ¶ 46. 
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The Supreme Court of Appeals had decided against Prince, 
determining that “the statutory prohibition on the use of [cannabis] was 
meant to protect public safety, order, health, and morals and that these 
considerations outweighed the right of Rastafarians to practice their 
religion through the use of [cannabis].”171 This decision was criticized as 
giving “little regard to what the free exercise right of a Rastafarian, or 
any other religious adherent . . . entails. The court limited the right before 
making an effort to define it and to determine its scope. This is a rights-
unfriendly manner of dealing with fundamental entitlements.”172 The 
Supreme Court of Appeals’ decision followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Oregon v. Smith,173 holding that the law, as it was of general 
applicability and was a legitimate state interest, was a reasonable 
infringement on free exercise. 
The Constitutional Court, however, took another route when it ruled 
on the appeal. The Court emphasized that the right to religion is 
“probably the most important of all human rights”174 and that the 
criminalization of cannabis even for religious purposes essentially 
criminalizes Rastafarianism, stigmatizes its adherents, puts them at risk 
for arrest and conviction, prevents some from pursuing their chosen 
profession, “degrades and devalues” Rastafarians, and “strikes at the 
very core of their human dignity.”175 The Court concluded that, despite 
the general validity of laws against cannabis use, the laws were over-
broad in their infringement of ceremonial use; thus, it held that the 
provisions of the Drug Act were “invalid to the extent that they did not 
allow for an exemption for the religious use, possession and 
transportation of cannabis by bona fide Rastafari.”176
A second opinion, which ultimately dissented on the basis that the 
exemption could not be regulated appropriately, still agreed with the 
majority that religious exemptions may be constitutionally required. The 
opinion addressed the majority’s inconsistency with the United States’ 
Smith and observed that the minority approach in Smith, denying the 
constitutionality of the generally applicable law because of its failure to 
include religious exemptions, was “more consistent with the 
requirements of [the South African] Constitution and . . . jurisprudence 
 171. Lourens du Plessis, Freedom of or Freedom from Religion? An Overview of the Issues 
Pertinent to the Constitutional Protection of Religious Rights and Freedom in “The New South 
Africa,” 2001 BYU L. REV. 439, 456. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Employ. Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 174. Prince, 2002 (1) SA 1, at ¶ 48. 
 175. Id. at ¶ 51. 
 176. Id. at ¶ 85. 
  
109] CONSTITUTION, CUSTOM, AND CREED 141 
 
on the limitation of rights, than . . . the majority.”177
An opinion concurring in the judgment expressed the need for 
tolerance and reasonable accommodation of religious beliefs, even if 
those beliefs seem bizarre or unwanted to the majority. The concurrence 
stressed that: 
 
Given our dictatorial past in which those in power sought incessantly to 
command the behavior, beliefs and tastes of all in society, it is no 
accident that the right to be different has emerged as one of the most 
treasured aspects of our new constitutional order. . . . Religious 
tolerance is . . . not only important to those individuals who are saved 
from having to make excruciating choices between their beliefs and the 
law. It is deeply meaningful to all of us because religion and belief 
matter, and because living in an open society matters.178
 
Ultimately, Prince is highly significant, not only because it protects 
religious freedom, but also because the Court demonstrated creativity, 
and perhaps wisdom, in determining a remedy: rather than ruling the 
provisions invalid outright, the Court determined that the declaration of 
invalidity would be “suspended for twelve months” while Parliament had 
the opportunity to remedy the statute’s defects.179 The Court declined to 
rule specifically on whether or not Prince should be admitted to the Law 
Society because it wanted to wait for Parliament to determine the scope 
and applicability of the religious exemption.180 In leaving the matter to 
Parliament, the Court recognized that legislative bodies can take a role in 
helping to develop existing laws to better conform to constitutional 
requirements. This approach may be ideal for dealing with other 
customary and religious law issues. 
 
B.  Marriage and Customary Law 
 
The Constitutional Court has in its ten-year history decided several 
important cases defining the limits of religious freedom and expression 
in Lawrence, Christian Education, and Prince. It has not considered a 
major case dealing with religious or customary marriage, but lower 
courts have made determinations about the validity of Muslim and 
 177. Id. at ¶ 128. 
 178. Id. at ¶ 170. 
 179. See id. at ¶ 86. 
 180. Id. at ¶ 88. For example, the Court ruled that Parliament may determine that the 
exemption should apply only to priests or other Rastafarian officials, in which case Prince would not 
be entitled to the exemption. In any case, the Court wisely left that to Parliament. 
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customary marriages, and Parliament has enacted legislation pursuant to 
the Bill of Rights’ authorization to recognize customary law in the 
“Recognition of Customary Marriage Act.” Despite the Constitutional 
Court’s relative silence, the issue of religious and customary marriage is 
an important one in South African society and may prove to be a litmus 
test for the extent to which the South African government is actually 
willing, in practice, to recognize customary and religious rights, 
particularly when those rights may be in conflict with other Bill of Rights 
guarantees. I will now discuss some of the cases that have been decided 
by lower courts and the legislation enacted by Parliament. Using the 
Constitutional Court’s holdings in Lawrence, Christian Education, and 
Prince, one can speculate about how the Court may likely rule if such 
cases are ever to reach it. In the end, there is a high possibility that the 
Court may invalidate customary and religious marriages on the basis of 
equality and non-sexism. 
The common law system of South Africa, based on Roman and 
Dutch law, “denies the status of marriage to all polygamous and 
potentially polygamous unions, which applies, inter alia, to Hindu and 
Muslim marriages and marriages concluded under indigenous African 
systems of law.”181 Prior to the 1996 Constitution, South African courts 
ruled (based on the common law) that “contractual obligations attending 
[an] invalid Muslim marriage, as well as other legal consequences 
intrinsic to the marriage (such as maintenance), are unenforceable.”182 
More recently, however, a Cape Town court held that since two parties 
were married by Muslim rites and their union was in fact monogamous, 
the contractual arrangements dealing with their marriage were 
enforceable.183 While this judgment was a step in the right direction, the 
court “was not called upon to proclaim the marriage valid, and expressly 
confined the binding effect of its judgment to a potentially polygamous 
union that is in fact monogamous.”184 Thus, whether Muslim marriages 
are legally valid is still a question; the court was only willing to 
recognize “contractual obligations” resultant from the union, and not the 
union per se. Additionally, the question remains as to whether 
contractual obligations resulting from a Muslim marriage that is actually 
polygamous will gain similar legal protection. 
The Supreme Court of Appeals validated this holding in Amod v. 
Multilateral Vehicle Accident Fund. In that case, the court decided that 
 181. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 831. 
 182. Id. at 833. (discussing Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) (S. Afr.)). 
 183. See van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 833–34 (discussing Ryland v Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 
(C) at 703 (S. Afr.)). 
 184. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 834. 
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“in view of ‘the new ethos of tolerance, pluralism, and religious 
freedom’ and given the fact that the marriage in this particular instance 
was de facto monogamous,” a contractual right to support resulting from 
a Muslim marriage “deserves recognition and protection by the law.”185 
Again, though, the court declined to rule on whether the marriage itself 
was valid, and restricted its holding to potentially polygamous marriages 
that are in fact monogamous. Some scholars criticize the continued 
failure to recognize Muslim marriages as discrimination on the basis of 
religion and as an infringement on religious freedom.186
Parliament has not enacted legislation explicitly recognizing 
religious marriages. This lack of legislation also helps to explain why 
courts are willing only to recognize the contractual effects of such unions 
but not their legal validity as marriage. Parliament has, however, given 
statutory recognition to customary marriages in the “Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act.”187 The Act came into effect in 2000 and is 
intended to recognize customary marriages while “bringing their 
personal and proprietary consequences in line with the Constitution.”188 
In doing so, the Act, while purportedly recognizing customary marriages 
that had not previously been recognized, “changed fundamentally the 
personal and proprietary consequences of customary marriages.”189 This 
was largely because “official” customary marriage law can be 
discriminatory against women, denying them property rights and other 
legal rights. While it is certainly the case that reform is needed in order 
to better secure the position of women and remedy the problems that 
resulted from codifying and stagnating customary law, the Act may not 
be the best solution, because it “deprives [people] of important cultural 
practices in the event that they choose customary law. The marriage 
might be ‘customary’ in name, but in many respects it will be regulated 
by the common law.”190
The Act does appear to protect some customary practices, such as the 
payment of “lobola” (or a dowry) as a part of the marriage. It also 
provides that polygamy is not an obstacle to the recognition of a 
customary marriage. However, it remains to be seen whether the 
Constitutional Court would invalidate those provisions on the basis that 
 185. Id. at 835. 
 186. See Brigitte Clark & A.J. Kerr, Dependant’s Action for Loss of Support: Are Women 
Married by Islamic Rites Victims of Unfair Discrimination? 116 S. AFR. L.J. 20, 24 (1999). 
 187. Act 120 of 1998. 
 188. Mothokoa Mamashela, New Families, New Property, New Laws: The Practical Effects of 
the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 20 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 616, 617 (2004). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Kult, supra note 48, at 719. 
  
144 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 21 
 
they discriminate against women.191 There are other aspects of customary 
marriage that may be inconsistent with individual equality according to 
the Bill of Rights. These include intestate succession, which, according 
to “official” customary law, tends to favor males. It is highly possible 
that courts will view aspects of customary marriage to be inconsistent 
with individual equality, given the Constitutional Court’s commitment to 
gender equality and nondiscrimination, and its tendency to put those 
values above customary or religious freedom, as it seemed to do in 
Christian Education. While the Court in Prince demonstrated a strong 
commitment to religious freedom, this was limited to a circumstance in 
which religious freedom conflicted with a legislative enactment, as 
opposed to a constitutional guarantee. In Prince, there were no 
fundamental rights of any other persons implicated. In the case of 
customary or religious marriages, on the other hand, the Court may very 
well decide that equal protection and gender equality overrides religious 
or cultural expressions that are inconsistent with equality. Indeed, the 
trend in other areas of customary law such as intestate succession 
appears to be one of “victory for the Constitution and a virtual refusal to 
accept customary law procedures as valid.”192 This trend has led some 
scholars to lament that: 
 
[C]ultural rights are indeed an empty shell. Regardless of the light 
under which South Africans view the reforms, for better or for worse, 
it is apparent that indigenous cultures are once again being told to 
discard what they know and to accept what others wish to thrust upon 
them. This they have done since 1652.193
 
It seems also that religious freedom, at least for minority groups like 
Muslims and Hindus, may also become an empty shell if nothing is done 
to reconcile the Western-style protections of individual rights with non-
Western cultural and religious practices. 
 
VI.  SOLUTIONS: BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITH RELIGIOUS AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS 
 
 The Constitution recognizes the importance of religious and 
cultural freedom, and provides avenues for the legislature to further 
protect that freedom. As discussed above, though, legislation such as the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, while a step in the right 
 191. See Sinclair, supra note 115, at 523. 
 192. Kult, supra note 48, at 728. 
 193. Id. at 729. 
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direction, potentially suffers from two severe defects: first, although it 
purports to recognize customary marriages, the Act requires that they 
conform with particular substantive requirements that undermine (and 
even render meaningless) much of the custom itself; and second, to the 
extent that the Act does allow customs such as lobola and polygyny, 
there is a danger that the Court will ultimately strike it down as 
repugnant to the equal protection of women. Legislation recognizing 
religious marriages may fall prey to the same weaknesses, and both may 
prove to be little more than lip-service to the ideas of religious and 
cultural liberty. One solution to this dilemma—and the solution that I 
suggest is the most compelling—is to ensure broad autonomy to local 
and provincial legislatures and councils to enable them to work out the 
problems in customary and religious law and help to reconcile those with 
the Constitution. Similar to what the Court did in Prince, it can identify 
constitutional problems but allow time for local governments to remedy 
those problems instead of imposing its own solution. Although it is 
necessary that there be some limited constitutional check to ensure that 
basic human rights remain protected, the Constitutional Court should be 
reluctant to impose Western values in its interpretation of human rights 
and should leave more room for group cultural and religious rights to 
factor into any test balancing the interests at stake in a conflict. The 
Court would be wisest to exercise restraint in rejecting customary law 
and should give local governments the opportunity to resolve problems 
before making judgments that will bind the whole of South Africa to one 
system of values and law. 
 
A.  The Importance of Group Cultural and Religious Rights 
 
Based on numerous constitutional provisions regarding cultural and 
religious rights, it is clear that the drafters of the Constitution were 
concerned with preserving a peaceful pluralism and diversity in South 
Africa. Recognizing that a Western democratic model of government 
was useful but not entirely indigenous, the drafters ensured that at least 
some protection was given to traditional modes of government, including 
customary law and traditional authorities. Perhaps this was especially 
acute for the drafters because of the repressive history of colonialism and 
apartheid in South Africa. Certainly, they did not want to repeat 
colonialism by “saving” the South African people with a Western value 
system. They probably also had seen that, in apartheid, individual 
freedom depended heavily on group rights: where group rights were 
curtailed, individual freedom suffered. Indeed, not only did the 
individual freedom of blacks suffer during apartheid, but also that of 
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sympathetic whites and others. Finally, while the rights of individuals are 
certainly important, Professor Fred Gedicks has discussed, in the 
American context, the importance of groups and group rights, 
particularly religious groups: 
 
[R]eligious groups are valuable to society and to individuals for at least 
three reasons. First, they protect the individual freedom of their 
members against government encroachment by providing an effective 
vehicle for challenging governmental power. Second, religious groups 
provide a context for the development of individual personality and 
identity that is considered important by the substantial number of 
Americans who remain significantly committed to religion and 
religious groups. Finally, because liberal democratic government is in 
theory severely constrained from both creating and advocating 
particular conceptions of morality, religious groups are part of a larger 
collection of necessary social institutions that create and maintain the 
values by which Americans choose to live their lives. 
 
One may properly describe religious groups . . . as an indispensable 
part of individual and social life in the United States.194
 
The same can be said for cultural groups, especially in the South African 
context. 
The benefits of group autonomy and rights are great even when those 
groups may infringe on individual rights through discriminatory 
practices. Professor Gedicks uses the example of membership practices 
that are discriminatory and even repugnant to the majority and argues: 
 
There can be no doubt that allowing religious groups an absolute 
freedom to set the terms of membership . . . will result in the protection 
of beliefs and practices that will be inconsistent with and even 
repugnant to the majority. This is the paradox of groups. They both 
enhance and subvert individual autonomy by challenging the sovereign 
power of the liberal state. Permitting the government to force 
fundamental change upon or to prohibit altogether certain kinds of 
groups because, in its judgment, such groups spawn a diffuse social 
harm or threaten the implementation of majoritarian social policy, is a 
subversion of the pluralist thesis. If the government can act to eliminate 
groups that it believes threaten majoritarian social policies and values 
 194. Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group 
Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 158. 
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merely because such groups are anti-majoritarian, then the power of the 
government over groups and individuals is unlimited. 
 
If one is genuinely concerned about threats to individual freedom, the 
pertinent question is whether individuals have more to fear from 
governmental power than they do from religious group autonomy.195
 
Thus, a court that is truly concerned about protecting individual 
freedoms and rights should also concern itself with protecting group 
religious and customary rights, even at the expense of what is viewed as 
discriminatory behavior in some eyes—for example, in religious groups 
who discriminate in their membership criteria. Although such a practice 
may be repugnant to the majority, the very existence of such counter-
majoritarian groups is helpful for the flourishing of democracy. 
 
B.  Customary Protection of Human Rights 
 
A court’s interest in protecting both individual and group rights is 
especially pronounced in light of the argument advanced by many South 
African scholars that customary law can be consistent with human rights 
norms. Substantive rights are not foreign to customary law, which 
recognizes specific rights such as the right to life, the right to a good 
name, the right to freedom of thought, the right to property, and the right 
to family life.196 Customary law has as its aim the protection of “human 
dignity,”197 which is the aim of other human rights guarantees, as 
expressed by the Constitutional Court in Prince.198 Of course, customary 
law focuses on group rights, but those are seen as an essential protection 
for individual rights. Customary law emphasizes community and social 
solidarity, recognizing that “[i]ndividuals do have rights, but many of 
these rights are exercised in the context of the group.”199
A concept that may prove key in the reconciliation of traditional 
African culture and a new constitutional human rights regime is the 
traditional African idea of “ubuntu.” Scholars point to “ubuntu” to 
demonstrate that customary law can promote human rights concerns. 
Ubuntu translates into “humaneness” or “morality” and emphasizes 
 195. Id. at 168. 
 196. R.B. Mqeke, Customary Law and Human Rights, 113 S. AFR. L.J. 364, 367 (1996). 
 197. Dlamini, supra note 82, at 6A-5. 
 198. See Prince v The President of the Law Soc’y of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 (1) SA 1 
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148 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 21 
 
“respect for human dignity,”200 as well as social justice and fairness.201 In 
one South African court decision, justices suggested that “ubuntu” 
provides “a connection between indigenous value systems and universal 
human rights embodied in international law.”202 Indeed, the concept of 
“ubuntu” could be the key to “constructing a particularly South African 
constitutional jurisprudence, one that will resonate with the indigenous 
values of the majority of South Africans.”203 Similar concepts are likely 
to be found in South Africa’s religious traditions and could also draw 
connections between the Constitution and South African religious values. 
Because a liberal, constitutional democracy is largely foreign to the 
majority of South Africans, forging this connection between religion or 
traditional African culture and the Constitution is essential—and 
possible. 
Moreover, customary rights and practices may not be as 
discriminatory as some suggest. That customary law necessarily 
discriminates against women—the most specific complaint lodged 
against its practice—is overly-simplistic. Scholars note that: 
 
[I]ndigenous law did provide a variety of institutions which tended to 
protect women as well. . . . The context of the family, the clan and 
ethnic solidarity or the kinship network, provided the framework within 
which individuals exercised their economic, political and social 
liberties and duties and provided restraints to arbitrary action.204
 
Indeed, that customary law now discriminates against women is a 
result of the codification of “official” customary law, and changing 
circumstances that rendered that law useless. For example, old 
inheritance patterns, which seemed favorable to men, were partly 
designed to ensure that a widowed woman was taken care of through an 
extended kinship network. Now that those networks have been disrupted 
by colonialism, capitalism, and urbanization, perhaps the inheritance 
patterns no longer make sense and need to change. Because customary 
law is fluid and responsive to changing social needs, adaptation should 
have happened; however, the codification of customary law prevented 
the necessary changes: “While living customary law is considered to be 
more flexible and accommodative of women’s rights, official customary 
law is perceived . . . as the embodiment of institutionalized gender 
 200. Mqeke, supra note 196, at 364. 
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inequality.”205 Attempting to codify it now could perpetuate the same 
problem, because eventually it would no longer respond to social needs.  
In fact, in many respects customary law has changed, “remov[ing] 
certain features of indigenous law which could be regarded as 
discriminatory against women, thus bringing the law in line with the Bill 
of Rights.”206 This has led one scholar to conclude that “customary law is 
dynamic and can adapt to meet the changing demands of society. . . . [I]t 
is in accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of the final 
constitution.”207
With regard to women’s rights and customary or religious law, the 
Constitutional Court and Parliament should avoid making Western-
centric judgments about women and their needs.208 Whatever one’s 
personal views about polygamy, one can recognize that there are those, 
including women, who do not find it discriminatory.209 The very fact that 
there is disagreement about the desirability of polygynous marriage 
systems suggests that the legislatures and the people, not the Court, 
should determine the contours of acceptable relationships. Outright 
failure to respect polygamous customary and Muslim marriages 
“amounts to unfair discrimination based on culture in the first instance 
and religion in the second.”210
Finally, it is important to note that failing to recognize customary or 
religious marriages at all may actually leave women worse off. One has 
only to look at early cases denying Muslim widows continued support to 
see that women who enter into such marriages—as women will likely 
continue to do, whether or not they are legally recognized—are double-
burdened if the state is unwilling to enforce their expected rights. When 
the state refuses to recognize a customary or religious marriage, “[t]hey 
have completely overlooked the fact that the position of the woman 
whose status they purport to enhance is worse off than before because 
she is left without a remedy.”211
Indeed, Justice Mokgoro of the Constitutional Court has admitted 
 205. Chuma Himonga & Craig Bosch, The Application of African Customary Law Under the 
Constitution of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning? 117 S. AFR. L.J. 306, 329 (2000). 
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 207. Ntusi Mbodla, Customary Law in Search of Development, 116 S. AFR.L.J. 742, 742 
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other people choose to live their lives. 
 209. See Sinclair, supra note 115, at 563. 
 210. Id. at 564. 
 211. Dlamini, supra note 82, at 6A-42. 
  
150 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 21 
 
that “customary law is a living law which affects millions of South 
Africans. It can therefore not be wished away. . . . [I]t is not so much the 
recognition of the system which is the source of tension, but the technical 
difficulties that arise from such recognition.”212 How, then, can we best 
resolve the technical problems resulting from the tension between the 
Bill of Rights and customary or religious practices? 
 
C.  Local Legislative Change and Customary Adaptation 
 
Some scholars suggest that the courts can provide a “dynamic 
application and development of customary law.”213 While the courts will 
certainly have a role in defining the meaning of the rights protected by 
the Constitution, I submit that courts ought not to assume a large role in 
re-crafting customary law. South African courts have been criticized as 
lacking a good understanding of customary law, particularly “living” 
customary law, and instead often refer to (and misinterpret) official 
customary law.214  They are equally inadequate at determining what 
Islamic religious norms or the norms of other religious groups should 
entail. Scholars have also cautioned courts to exercise judicial restraint in 
order to maintain legitimacy in a divided country.215
The Constitutional Court set a wise precedent for itself when, in its 
judgment in Prince, it refrained from refashioning the law itself and 
instead described the nature of the violation and proposed possible 
remedies, but ultimately left the changes up to Parliament. A similar 
approach could be used with regard to customary and religious law, 
although, instead of the National Parliament, the Court could encourage 
provincial and local governments (in the case of customary law) and 
religious organizations (regarding religious law) to work to harmonize 
apparently conflicting values with the Bill of Rights. 
Such a solution is possible within the framework of powers allocated 
by the 1996 Constitution. With regard to indigenous and customary law, 
the Constitution gives concurrent jurisdiction to Parliament and 
provincial legislatures.216 In most cases, a provincial law will prevail 
over an act of Parliament on an issue over which both have jurisdiction 
(unless there is a compelling problem that the national government needs 
 212. Mokgoro, supra note 85, at 1289. 
 213. Meide, supra note 86, at 104. 
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to address).217 Given this grant of concurrent authority to Parliament and 
provincial governments, it is reasonable that changes to customary 
practices can occur through legislative amendment, “preceded by a 
thorough investigation of the legal position and the implications of 
proposed changes, rather than leaving everything to the courts.”218 In this 
way, while indigenous law will not be “insulated from human rights,” 
attempts can be made to reconcile the two.219 Where they are truly 
incompatible: 
 
[T]he underlying reason for that should be established before the rule of 
indigenous law is rejected. It is crucial in a democratic state that the 
democratic process be followed in changing the law. Those who are 
affected by indigenous law should be given an opportunity to discuss 
the possible reforms and to express their views to their elected 
representatives or to a commission appointed by the legislature.220
 
Many scholars agree. One suggests that, while change might 
certainly be needed, a “destructive confrontation between the Bill of 
Rights and legislation, on the one hand, and customary law . . . on the 
other, need not take place.”221 The Constitutional Court itself has 
recognized this, holding in a case involving customary law and intestate 
succession that “the legislature rather than the court should develop 
customary law.”222  
While admittedly more complicated than the reform of customary 
law, religious law can also be changed at a local level. The reform of 
Muslim law serves as an example of how all religious law in South 
African may be reformed at a local level. Muslim scholars have 
suggested that it ought to be. One scholar suggests that reform in Muslim 
personal law is well on its way,223 and that legal tools exist among 
Islamic scholars to speed the process of reform.224 She further suggests 
that “[p]resent-day Muslim jurists should also consider the possibility of 
introducing reforms within the framework of Islamic principles in, for 
example, the area of laws relating to maintenance [in marriage].”225 Even 
Muslim feminists agitating for change in the Islamic community suggest 
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Even though the Constitution promotes and protects the human rights 
of women through national machinery, their powers do not extend 
beyond the Constitution. Gradual social reform within the Muslim 
community, along with active participation by Muslim women, appear 
to be more realistic safeguards and long term solutions for effective 
improvement to the status of women.226
 
Although the process of reforming Muslim personal law, and any 
other religious law for that matter, may be more difficult for the courts to 
conceive of than that of reforming customary law, at least courts can start 
by being sensitive to the religious liberty of Muslim women and allowing 
them, within that community, to agitate for the changes that they need 
while preserving the religious liberty of the group. Sensitivity to 
religious liberties will better prevent the discrimination that has 
historically occurred against Muslims in South Africa. 
South Africa’s Constitution is young and it is difficult to determine 
how exactly the national government, courts, and local governments can 
work together to preserve individual rights and group rights. What is 
important at present is that the framework for such cooperation exists, 
given the nature of concurrent powers between national and local 
government, the respect given to local tribal leaders, and the history of 
customary adaptation. The Court has, in the past, been willing to defer to 
legislative bodies to come up with solutions to constitutional problems 
that better reflect the will of the South African people; if it can continue 
to do so, South Africa can continue to work toward ideals of individual 
rights while preserving the customs and cultures of its people. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
South Africa’s commitment to individual rights and equality is 
admirable and is certainly key to overcoming the devastating effects of 
the apartheid regime. Also important, though, is South Africa’s 
constitutional recognition of the importance of local culture, customs, 
and religion. South Africa’s courts have generally respected religious 
freedom, but have done so on the basis of Western ideals about 
individual rights and equality. As the courts continue to develop South 
Africa’s constitutional jurisprudence, they should also consider the 
impact of their decisions on local customs and culture, and should be 
 226. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 838. 
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mindful that those, too, are important rights. In so doing, the courts can 
work with Parliament and local government structures to help to develop 
customary law in accordance with developing notions of social justice 
and equality. 
There are very real disagreements between the courts and the South 
African people on a variety of important human rights issues, such as sex 
equality, abortion, religious freedom, and capital punishment. Those 
disagreements threaten to perpetuate a disconnect between the Western 
ideals present in South Africa’s Bill of Rights and traditional South 
African society and values. A recent example is the gay marriage debate 
in South Africa; disputes about what types of marriages are legitimate 
under South African law are currently a focal point of public 
controversy. In December of 2005, the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa officially recognized same-sex marriages, holding that the denial 
of such recognition is a violation of individual equality and equal 
protection.227 Oddly enough, unless provisions are made to guarantee the 
right to marriage under customary and religious law, the Court will have 
found itself recognizing as “fundamental” something that is approved of 
by few South Africans, while failing to recognize marital practices that 
have been established in South Africa for centuries.228 Whatever one’s 
opinion on gay marriage, the Court’s strong stance in its favor is an 
instance of the Court’s commitment to Western human rights norms, 
regardless of local public opinion. If the Court continues to forge a path 
so different from its people’s traditions, without recognizing or 
respecting those traditions, respect for constitutionalism and the rule of 
law may be undermined and the purposes of the Bill of Rights 
subverted—as has happened in so many of the young democracies in 
post-colonial Africa. 
As in other post-colonial African countries, a Constitution and 
judiciary are foreign to the South African people.229 If constitutionalism 
is to survive meaningfully in South Africa—and indeed, it should, as it is 
ultimately the best solution for negotiating between the factions and 
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disagreements that will inevitably arise in the diverse country230—it will 
need to prove itself accepting of and acceptable to local culture. 
Furthermore, in order to avoid a repeat of “cultural imperialism,” such as 
occurred during colonialism, and ensure that principles of human rights 
and respect for the  rule of law remain firmly rooted in South Africa, 
local cultures need to adopt, incorporate, and “hybridize” constitutional 
norms with their own understandings and values,231 such of that of 
“ubuntu.” Simply abolishing indigenous or religious law “can lead to 
people resorting to informal ‘people’s law’ and the official law will 
become ‘paper law,’”232 which would be disastrous in terms of South 
Africa’s attempts to solidify a new Constitution and a new legal order. 
The incorporation of a constitutional democracy and human rights 
values into local culture may be accomplished by recognizing what those 
differing systems of thought have to offer to each other with regard to the 
protection of human rights. Ultimately, the preservation of “traditional” 
customary and religious law may be the best way that the courts can 
ensure the continued development of a “modern” South Africa by 
facilitating respect for the rule of law and constitutionalism among all 
South African people.  
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